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Blackout of Interconnected Electric Power Companies:
Recovery and Prevention Measures
The electric power industry has recently' commenced a tech-
nological development of great significance involving a system of
interconnections among power companies, making their power
available to each other on a day-to-day basis and as a means of
emergency supply. While the purpose for interconnection among
power companies is to provide supplemental power should any
company's generation become deficient, the interconnected sys-
tem can spread local power failures by drawing power away from
companies otherwise able to supply their own loads. Thus the
power failure in northeastern United States on November 9,
1965, the most serious system disruption to date, magnified a
simple line disconnection into a blackout affecting some 30
million people in eight states for as long as thirteen hours.2 At
least three interconnected power systems have experienced
crippling blackouts in the last few years,3 giving some indica-
tion of the great threat of power system disruption. It has been
said that only the unusual coolness of the summer of 1967 pre-
vented more and even larger system blackouts.4
The potential personal and industrial damage arising from
such a power failure is staggering, and estimates place losses
from the November 9, 1965, blackout in excess of $100 million.
1. The Canada-United States Eastern Interconnection, discussed
herein, has been in operation since 1955 or 1956. Interconnection of
power companies began in the 1930's. Brand, Northeast Electric Bulk
Power Supply, PuB. UTI_. FORT., June 9, 1966, at 65, 80-81 [hereinafter
cited as Brand].
2. Priest, Utility Service Outages and Interruptions: The "Big
Blackout," PuB. UTiL. FORT., Aug. 17, 1967, at 19; FPC, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT ON THE NORTHEAST POWER FAURE, NOVEMBER 9-10, passim
(1965) [hereinafter cited as FPC]; N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1965, at 1, col. 1
(concise summary of the FPC report).
3. FPC, REPORT ON THE PENNSYLVANiA-NEw JERsEY-MARYLAxD
INTERCONNECTION POWER FAILuRE, JuNE 5, 1967 passim (1968); FPC at
67-76 (Report on the Missouri Basin Area Power Interruption of Janu-
ary 28, 1965).
4. 114 CONG. REc. H575 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1968).
5. TIME, Nov. 19, 1965, at 36, 42. This estimate is probably very
conservative. The reported industrial loss included 300,000 loaves of
bread which spoiled during baking operations, 350 Chevrolet engines
ruined when a high speed drill froze while boring, and 1,700 Dunlop
tires destroyed in the curing process. Id. In addition, the deaths of
three people have been attributed to the power failure. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 16, 1965, at 58, col. 4. A more distant ramification was reflected
in the sharp increase in births nine months later. N.Y. Times, Aug. 10,
1966, at 1, col. 2.
BLACKOUT
A metropolis finding itself without power at the rush hour
faces great problems-for example, the New York City Transit
Authority was forced to recruit people from the streets to rescue
patrons stranded in subway cars,' one man lit a candle and acci-
dentally ignited his apartment,7 and some 200 airplanes ap-
proaching Kennedy Airport were saved from disaster by a bright
moon.8
While the question of liability for injuries arising from the
disruption of an interconnected power system has not yet been
litigated, the common law and statutory duties of power com-
panies to provide safe and adequate service apparently offer a
basis upon which blackout victims could recover their losses
from the interconnected power companies. Existing cases al-
low recovery for injuries resulting from a single power com-
pany's negligent breach of these duties, so it would seem that
the negligent planning of an interconnected power system, re-
sulting in a system blackout, would also be grounds for recovery.
In certain situations, recovery from interconnected power com-
panies could also be predicated upon express or implied contract
theory. Patrons of public service organizations might claim re-
covery for their blackout injuries on the grounds of negligent
failure by the public service company to maintain emergency
auxiliary power supplies. It is the purpose of this Note to evalu-
ate these various theories of recovery and the possible defenses
to them. Since the public has a strong interest in reliable
power supply, and since federal regulation would probably offer
a more desirable means of regulating power company practices
in this area than would personal recovery by injured customers,
it will be argued that the regulatory provisions of the Federal
Power Act should be strengthened according to the provisions of
the proposed Federal Power Reliability Act.
I. BACKGROUND
The interconnected power system is built upon a network of
control areas, which may consist of either groups of power com-
panies or a single company or part of a company.9 Normally,
each control area is expected to be self-sufficient, with its gener-
ation capability balanced against its customer power usage.
6. See note 50 infra.
7. See note 49 infra.
8. See note 107 infra.
9. Control areas are geographically defined by surrounding power
lines known as boundary ties, which also connect the area with sur-
rounding areas. Brand at 70.
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The interconnected network of control areas, constituting a power
pool, plans as a unit for day-to-day operational efficiencies
and for emergency generation and transmission needs.10 The
geographic grid arrangement offers great economic advantage by
allowing power companies to utilize natural resources more
fully in supplying power, and to separate generating facilities
from metropolitan centers." The emergency power supply of-
fered by a power pool to member utilities is reliable only when
the system as a whole has a surplus generating capacity and a
set of interconnecting lines sufficient to supply any control area
which fails to supply its own load.
The power failure which disrupted the Canada-United States
Eastern Interconnection (CANUSE) on the evening of Novem-
ber 9, 1965, well illustrates the danger of an insufficiently inter-
connected 12 power pool. This Northeast blackout apparently in-
volved no mechanical failure, 3 sabotage, or inclement weather or
10. Brand at 78, 79. Thus it is necessary for a power companyjoining an interconnected power pool to surrender to the pool a portion
of the planning authority previously exercised solely by the power com-
pany. Brand at 77. The integrated system operates under the principle
of "pool assist"-when the load in any control area increases suddenly
beyond the area's generating capacity, turbine valve governors act on
generators in adjoining areas of the system to send the necessary power
into the overloaded area. Brand at 70, 71; see N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1965,
at 36, col. 2, 4.
11. For example, costs of land, labor, and materials would tend to
be lower in non-metropolitan areas. The transmission network in New
York State in 1965 allowed New York City to draw sizeable amounts of
power from Niagara Falls and from a nuclear reactor located away from
the metropolitan area. FPC at 19, 21. A well integrated power pool
also offers great operating efficiencies and economies of scale, such as
centralized planning and the matching of divergent daily and seasonal
load peaks. FPC at 21; see Fontaine, Area Planning for Low-cost Power,
PUB. Urn.. FORT., July 3, 1958, at 20-27; Luce & Kaseberg, The Bonneville
Power Marketing Area Legislation: Is Regionalism in Electric Power
Planning Old Fashioned?, 45 ORE. L. REv. 251, 269-71 (1966).
12. It has, in fact, been said that the CANUSE system, as it existed
in 1965, was not sufficiently integrated to constitute a power pool, but
was rather a cooperative effort by power companies acting individually.
PuB. UTiL. FORT., Jan. 6, 1966, at 62 (statement of FPC Chairman Swid-
ler). The CANUSE system included all of New England, New York,
most of lower Michigan, and much of southern Ontario, Canada.
CANUSE was interconnected with adjoining grids, primarily the Penn-
sylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM). Brand at 81;
FPC at 6 exhib. I-E. In the CANUSE system, twenty-six per cent of the
power was produced by hydroelectric plants, most of which are con-
centrated near Niagara Falls, and excess power from these generators
was transmitted to the more heavily loaded metropolitan centers. FPC
at 2, 9, 12.
13. Early reports indicated mechanical failure. N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
16, 1965, at 58, col. 1. Further investigation discredited this suggestion,
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other natural calamity. Because of the bright moon and the
cooperative efforts of many of the people involved, the number
of serious accidents and injuries incurred was minimized.14
The Northeast blackout was precipitated by the disconnec-
tion of one of five 230-kilovolt capacity transmission lines con-
necting Sir Adam Beck Plant No. Two on the Canadian side of
Niagara Falls with Toronto.1 Personnel operating the Ontario
power system, being uninformed of the load limit set for these
lines,' allowed the current flow to reach the set limit, and a
circuit breaker disconnected the line, redistributing the flow to
the other four lines, which disconnected in turn within 2.7 sec-
onds.17 The initial result of the separation of Beck from its pri-
mary load was a massive surge of power south into New York
State.' This surge of power activated circuit breakers which
however. FPC at 6-8. In cases involving blackouts caused by defective
equipment, customers of the power companies affected should be
allowed recovery from the manufacturer or seller of the defective equip-
ment on the theory of products liability. See Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963);
Prosser, Fal of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MAbNw. L. Rnv. 791 (1966).
14. TimE, Nov. 19, 1965, at 36, 41. Further complication was avoided
when great numbers of people volunteered to direct the rush hour traffic.
Id.
15. Brand at 81, 82; FPC at 4-8. In 1963, each of these five lines
had been equipped with a protective backup relay (circuit breaker) to
open the line in case of failure of the primary relay on each line at Beck
and to detect faults further north in the Ontario Hydro system. In
order to detect such faults, it was necessary to set the backup relays
at 375 megawatts, which was considerably below the load-carrying
capacity of the lines. The flow on these lines had gradually increased
since 1963, until under the influence of the high seasonal load it ap-
proached the set limit. Brand at 82; FPC at 6-8.
16. Brand at 82; FPC at 8. In view of the steadily increasing load
upon this transmission network, it would seem that the failure to inform
Hydro Ontario system operators of the line limits was a negligent omis-
sion. Since the heavy load on these lines resulted partly from efforts
by the system operators to compensate for generation deficiencies in
Ontario by drawing power from the United States, FPC at 7-8, had
those operators been aware of the load limit settings, they could have
taken other compensatory measures and the outage could have been
prevented.
17. FPC at 22.
18. Brand at 82; FPC at 9. Although there is a conflict as to the
size of the power surge into New York State, it was apparently at
least 1500 megawatts. This surge of power raised the generator output
of upstate New York far above the load on the generators. Since an
operating generator can convert water or steam energy into electric
energy only in amounts required to supply the current load, the result of
a sudden decrease in load (or increase in generation) is an increase in
the rotation rate of the generators' turbines, thereby increasing the fre-
quency of the electric power produced. Brand at 83; see N.Y. Times,
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opened several lines,19 including the 345 kilovolt network serv-
ing New York City and all lines connecting CANUSE with th2
Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM). The
total effect of these openings was to create an isolated, though
still interconnected, area consisting of greater New York City
plus Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Vermont.
This area, which had been importing power at the time of the
disturbance,2 0 was now left to its own generation capacity. One
by one, the overloaded generators were forced to shut down.
Meanwhile, the generators near Niagara Falls became separated
from their primary load, rose in frequency, and were forced to
shut down, engulfing the entire area in darkness.
II. FORESEEABILITY AND THE PLANNING FUNCTION
It is clear that the Northeast blackout was in fact unfore-
seen by the power companies.21 However, it seems equally clear
in retrospect that a blackout of great extent could have been
predicted by a formula accounting for generating capacity and
load of each control area, strength of boundary ties within the
system and between CANUSE and PJM, level of circuit breaker
settings, and speed of utilization of reserve generating capacity.-2 2
Nov. 12, 1965, at 36, col. 2. Because the generators in an intercon-
nected grid are normally electrically interlocked at the same frequency,
Brand at 66, when one generator suddenly goes out of phase the system
as a whole loses its transient stability. When such a disturbance
occurs, the system will remain integrated only if it can survive the
transient instability long enough for the governors of the erratic gener-
ators to bring those generators back into phase. Brand at 66-67; FPC
at 63-65. The CANUSE system failed this test on November 9, 1965.
19. For a map of the lines involved, showing chronological order of
disconnnections, see FPC at 22 exhib. I-L. The two lines transmitting the
power surge into New York State remained closed only because they
were equipped with time relays and the current did not exceed the set
limit long enough to trip these lines open. FPC at 12.
20. The combined area had been importing 540 megawatts of power
from upstate New York generators prior to the disturbance. FPC at 12.
This large isolated area was not able to activate its reserve "spinning"
capacity (capacity on the line but not generating power) rapidly
enough to supply the deficit. Id. The overloading of the steam gen-
erators caused a reduction in the frequency of the current produced,
thus further restricting the output of the pumps required for steam
generation, a process known as the cascade effect. Id.; see Brand at 84.
21. It was unanticipated that all five lines from the Beck plant to
Toronto should open at the same time, creating the massive power surge
into New York State. FPC at 9. Niagara Mohawk Vice President Pratt
termed the breakdown the "most unlikely thing to happen." N.Y.
TnuEs, Nov. 20, 1965, at 55, col. I.
22. Cf. Brand at 85-88. Brand discusses the effects of decentralized
planning at various levels of power generation and transmission.
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In assessing the liability of power companies for power fail-
ures occurring within the context of an interconnected power
grid, the first potential basis of liability would be the fact of
having been tied into a power pool. Assuming the pool arrange-
ment to have surplus generating capacity plus boundary ties suf-
ficient in capacity to support the load of any control area which
was forced to draw from the remainder of the pool, it would
seem that the risk taken by a utility in joining the pool was
statistically justified23 by virtue of the safeguard afforded the
power company should it lose its individual generating capa-
city. The advantages of the grid arrangement for insuring a
constant supply of power have been widely recognized,24 and it
appears that the proper measure for prevention of major power
failures is stronger interconnection rather than isolation of
power companies.
While it would seem unreasonable to hold a power company
liable on the mere fact of interconnection, liability might be based
upon faulty planning of the pool, resulting in inadequate bound-
ary ties and generation capacity. In the case of the North-
east blackout, it has been estimated that higher capacity bound-
ary ties probably would have prevented the disconnection of
CANUSE from PJM as well as the breaking up of CANUSE into
isolated areas.25 CANUSE reserve generation facilities, which
were of sufficient capacity to supply the deficit, consisted of
steam output, which could not be put into operation quickly
23. There is no available evidence on the number of grid dis-
turbances and local power failures for which power pools make com-
pensation, but the ratio of such disturbances to system blackouts appar-
ently becomes very large as the level of system integration increases.
See note 24 infra.
24. Luce & Kaseberg, The Bonneville Power Marketing Area Legis-
lation: Is Regionalism in Electric Power Planning Old Fashioned?, 45
ORE. L. REV. 251, 269 (1966); Udall, Transmission, Interconnections,
and Power Pooling, PUB. UT. FORT., June 9, 1966, at 51, 52-53 (statement
of the Secretary of the Interior); PUB. UTiL. FORT., Jan. 6, 1966, at 61
(statement of FPC Chairman Swidler).
25. Brand at 83; FPC at 9. For example, if the 345 kilovolt net-
work from the Niagara Falls area to New York City had been of suffi-
cient capacity to absorb the initial surge of power, Consolidated Edi-
son control area in New York City would not have been isolated from
the generators near Niagara Falls. This would have prevented the over-
loading of Consolidated Edison and perhaps minimized the overgenera-
tion near Niagara Falls long enough for the Niagara Falls generators to
readjust. Although the basic network supplying New York City opened,
Consolidated Edison might still have been served had the boundary ties
with PJM been sufficient first to absorb the surplus on the CANUSE




enough to save the system.26
The customer's claim based upon alleged negligent plan-
ning of the power pool will require a demonstration that the
faulty planning was the proximate cause of the power failure
and that a blackout of such extent was foreseeable at the time
of planning. A blackout becomes an inevitable consequence 27
for consumers in a power grid which is planned inadequately
to supply member power companies forced to draw power from
the pool. In the absence of external causative factors, when the
grid system fails to absorb the sort of disturbance it was de-
signed to protect power companies from, it would seem reason-
able to assume that the planning of the pool was the proximate
cause of the extension of the power failure throughout the sys-
tem.
III. LIABILITY OF INTERCONNECTED POWER
COMPANIES
Common law has imposed a duty on public utilities to render
adequate and safe service. 28 When an electric power company
undertakes to supply a customer with current, the company has
an enforceable obligation to provide adequate and continuous
service. Recovery against power companies for failure to provide
constant and adequate service has been allowed in tort actions
on negligence theory29 and in actions for breach of an express
or implied promise to provide electric service. 30 In the context
of the interconnected power pool, it would seem that the pos-
sibilities of recovery would be increased as the power failure
became attributable to the actions of a large number of power
companies. This is true because of the greater number of viable
theories of recovery and total number of defendants.
Although electric power companies are under a duty of rea-
26. FPC at 12; see note 20 supra.
27. See W. PROSSER, TORTS 242 (3d ed. 1964).
28. See Telluride Power Co. v. Williams, 164 F.2d 685, 687-88 (10th
Cir. 1947); Allen C. Driver, Inc. v. Mills, 199 Md. 420, 425, 86 A.2d 724,
726 (1952); Homes v. Monongahela Power Co., 136 W.Va. 877, 69 S.E.2d
131 (1952); Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate
Service: Its Scope and Enforcement, 62 CoLmvL. L. REv. 312 (1962).
29. See, e.g., Langley v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 41 Cal. 2d 655,
262 P.2d 846 (1953); Milford Canning Co. v. Central Illinois Pub. Serv.
Co., 39 Ill. App. 2d 258, 188 N.E.2d 397 (1963); Southwestern Pub. Serv.
Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa Growers' Ass'n, 67 N.M. 108, 353 P.2d 62 (1960);
Annot., 4 A.L.R. 3d 594 (1965).
30. Bromer v. Florida Power & Light Co., 45 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1950);
Lund v. Village of Princeton, 250 Minn. 472, 85 N.W.2d 197 (1957); Annot.
4 A.L.R.3d 594 (1965). But see Colonial Products Co. v. Pennsylvania
Pub. Util. Comm'n, 188 Pa. Super. 163, 146 A.2d 657 (1958).
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sonable care, they are not held to be guarantors of an adequate or
constant supply of service.31 It has been argued that a public
utility should not be held to be an insurer of its service unless it is
first given the opportunity to refuse to enter into such a contract
or to adjust its rates upward to reflect the added burden.32
It has also been held that power companies are bound to
exercise a very high degree of care in providing safe service as
opposed to the duty of reasonable care to keep a constant sup-
ply.33 However, the high duty of care may apparently be in-
voked in a rather wide set of circumstances. In Southwestern
Public Service Company v. Artesia Alfalfa Growers' Association34
the power company was held liable for the value of electric mo-
tors burned out by the irregular and excessive flow of power al-
lowed through its worn out capacitator. This case would appar-
ently support a claim against a power pool which maintained
facilities causing a dangerously high or low voltage power supply
in time of system disturbance.
In Brockman v. Smithson Springs Water Company,3 5 the
Public Utilities Commission of California recognized the duty of
public utilities to serve all customers within their service area
to the reasonable limit of their facilities. The Commission ruled
that defendant, a water company, must provide for the reason-
able demands of all consumers within its certified service area
by maintaining a storage reserve of 300,000 gallons before it
would be allowed to extend service to consumers beyond that
area. The Commission characterized the duty as a basic rule of
public utility law. A reasonable inference from Brockman is
that an electric utility could be held liable to its customers for
power failures caused by customers of other utilities drawing
power from the service area.
31. Bromer v. Florida Power & Light Co., 45 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1950);
Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 594 (1965); Note, supra note 28. Since power compa-
nies are under only a reasonable duty to provide constant and adequate
service, there is no absolute liability for power failures.
32. 45 So. 2d at 660. Power companies seldom have an opportunity
not to serve a consumer within their service areas. Note, supra note 28,
at 321; See note 35 infra.
33. Caraglio v. Frontier Power Co., 192 F.2d 175, 177 (10th Cir.
1951); Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa Growers' Ass'n,
67 N.M. 108, 120-21, 353 P.2d 62, 70-71 (1960).
34. 67 N.M. 108, 353 P.2d 62 (1960).




A. RECOVERY ON NEGLIGENCE THEORY
The test of negligence in a case where an interconnected
power pool is disrupted by a blackout would be whether the
power company, in planning the pool, exercised the ordinary
care of reasonably prudent electrical engineers planning emer-
gency power supplies.36 Although it would be difficult to say
that the failure of CANUSE planners to contemplate the specific
phenomena of the Northeast blackout constitutes substandard
conduct, Federal Power Commission (FPC) criticisms of the
CANUSE and PJM arrangements at least indicate that the facts
are such as to raise a jury question of negligence.3 7
Curry v. Norwood Electric Light and Power Company38 of-
fers some support for a finding of negligence. In that case, plain-
tiff-proprietor was forced to remit the price of tickets to his
theater when defendant failed to supply sufficient power to
show a movie. Defendant's water-powered generator was un-
able to supply the load when a paper mill upstream shut down,
lessening the amount of water below its dam. Defendant's aux-
iliary steam generator could not be put into operation quickly
enough to supply the deficit. Arguing that this combination of
events was foreseeable and should have been prepared for, the
court upheld a jury finding of negligence. Curry would thus
support the proposition that failure of a power company to plan
an adequate emergency power supply may constitute actionable
negligence.
In actions based upon the negligent failure of power com-
panies to provide constant and adequate service, the courts
have been inconsistent in allocating the burden of proof. The
Tenth Circuit has required the customer to plead and prove
negligence on the part of the power company,39 while the Court
36. See W. PROSSER, TORTS 164 (3d ed. 1964); cf. Bell, Professional
Negligence of Architects and Engineers, 12 VAmn. L. REV. 711 (1959).
37. Compare FPC at 2 with note 93 infra. On the other hand, the
power failure which struck PJM on June 5, 1967 could have been pre-
vented had system operators properly switched generation in relation
to transmission capacity so as to prevent overloading of lines, or had
they followed instructions to prepare emergency load shedding plans.
FPC, REPORT ON THE PENNSYLVANIA-NEw JERsEY-MARYLAND INTERcON-
NECTION POWER FAILURE, JUNE 5, 1967 at 1, 6, 68 (1968). These planning
irregularities would seem to constitute the sort of substandard conduct
required for recovery on negligence theory in power failure cases.
38. 125 Misc. 279, 211 N.Y.S. 441 (St. Lawrence County Ct. 1925).
39. Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Western Pub. Serv. Co.,
142 F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1944); accord, Bromer v. Florida Power & Light
Co., 45 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1950).
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of Appeals of Kentucky has placed upon the power company the
burden of proving itself free from negligence when the customer
brings forth some evidence of company negligence.40 In a case
where the customer relied upon the power company's admission
of a system overload as evidence of negligence, 41 the Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut looked to the power company to
bring forth evidence on both negligence and causation. Hold-
ing that an overload is not per se evidence of negligence, the
court stated that the theory of res ipsa loquitur would be in-
applicable in such a case, though the customer would prevail if
he could prove that it was "more probable than not" that the
company's fault was the proximate cause of the power failure.42
Placing the burden of proof on the power company seems
justified. The question of allocation of burden of proof could
be very important to the disposition of actions where the issues
of negligence and causation were sharply contested, as they
might well be in cases involving the disruption of an insuffi-
ciently interconnected power pool. One reason for placing the
burden of proof upon the power company would be that the evi-
dence of causation is much more readily available to it than to
the customer, and the company would be more conversant with
the operations and facilities of its system.43 It would also seem
consistent with the high degree of care required of public utili-
ties to place upon the power company the burden of justifying
its nonexecution of that duty. Presumably a customer injured
as a result of a power failure occurring within the context of
an inadequately integrated power pool would likely prevail on
the issues of negligence and causation if he could shift to the
power company the burden of proving it had exercised due
care.
In appropriate cases, the customer might claim recovery by
imputing to his power company the negligence of an intercon-
40. Kentucky Power Co. v. Kilbourn, 307 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. 1957); see
Dunning v. Kentucky Util. Co., 270 Ky. 44, 109 S.W.2d 6 (1937).
41. Senderoff v. Housatonic Pub. Serv. Co., 147 Conn. 18, 156 A.2d
517 (1959).
42. Id. at 20, 156 A.2d at 518. Prosser lists as an essential con-
dition for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur that
"the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone's negligence." W. PROSSER, TORTS 218 (3d ed. 1964).
Electric lines could become overloaded in the absence of human negli-
gence. See note 54 infra.
43. The difficulty of tracing a grid blackout back to its source
is described in FPC at 17-18. The highly technical vocabulary required
to explain a major blackout fully will at best be very difficult for one
not trained in electronics to comprehend.
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nected power company and its agents or employees. Under this
theory, the customer would have to demonstrate that the pool ar-
rangement constituted either a partnership or a joint adventure.44
Factors indicating a joint adventure would include a single un-
dertaking, involving business purposes and activity, with partici-
pants having a community of interests and bearing fiduciary rela-
tionships to one another. 45 In the case where a group of power
companies, acting autonomously, buy and sell small amounts of
power among themselves, the arrangement might take on the as-
pect of a mere on-going business transaction. As planning be-
comes more centralized, however, and the level of interconnection
increases to the point where the power companies become supple-
mental to each other in providing emergency supply, the compa-
nies' individual activities and responsibilities take on a joint
aspect.4 6 Since there is vicarious liability for joint adventurers,47
each power company should then be liable for the torts of every
other utility in the grid arrangement.
In the integrated power pool situation, it would seem rea-
sonable to limit the principle of vicarious tort liability to cases
of negligence committed within the scope and purposes of the
power pool, and which either was known or should have been
known by the power company to whom the negligence is sought
to be imputed. If the company to be charged with the negli-
gence knew that the power pool was being operated negligently,
then that company could have exercised whatever control was
available to it in preventing such negligence, or it could in some
cases have quit the power pool. Failure by the company to take
such action would offer a conceptual basis for imputing fault to
it, and tort recovery might be appropriate. In the distinguish-
44. See J. CRANE, PARTNERSHIPS 160-65 (2d ed. 1952); W. PRossER,
TORTs 488, 489 (3d ed. 1964).
45. CRANE, supra note 44 at 160-63; see Beck v. Cagle, 46 Cal. App.
2d 152, 115 P.2d 613 (1941).
46. Proving the power pool to be a partnership would presum-
ably be even more difficult. Partners are commonly said to be agents
of one another, having full right to control the business. CRANE, supra,
note 44 at 159-60. A partnership may, though it typically does not,
involve a single undertaking. The joint adventure is typically not the
principal or sole undertaking of the participants, as the partnership
would be. Id. Since the same tort rules apply to both entities, it should
not matter which was proven to exist.
47. Keiswetter v. Rubenstein, 235 Mich. 36, 209 N.W. 154 (1926);
CRANE, supra note 44, at 163-65; W. PRoss].M, TORTS 488, 489 (3d ed. 1964).
Customers basing claims upon the Northeast blackout might allege such
negligence as the failure to inform nnmao Ontario systems operators of
backup relay settings. See note 16 supra.
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able case where interconnection of power companies is forced
by the FPC,48 and there is no privity of interest indicating joint
adventure, it would seem inappropriate to impute the negligence
of a power company to the other companies.
As a limitation upon tort recovery under present law, the
customer alleging a blackout injury will have to prove his in-
jury to have been the proximate result of the defendant power
company's negligence, whether the alleged negligence be imputed
or actual. Shortly after the Northeast blackout, actions were
commenced against Consolidated Edison of New York City by a
customer 49 seeking to recover damages resulting when a candle
he lit during the blackout set fire to his apartment, and by the
New York City Transit Authority5 0 seeking to recover, inter alia,
the overtime wages paid to men recruited from off the streets to
rescue patrons from stranded subway cars. The fire damage
action, involving such intervening factors as the location of
combustible materials in plaintiff's apartment and the degree of
care exercised by plaintiff, is but a tenuous result of the power
company's negligence, and recovery should be denied. 1  By
contrast, the necessity of rescuing stranded passengers was a
direct and immediate consequence of the power failure, so the
expenses involved would seem to be a sufficiently proximate re-
sult of the power failure to justify recovery. The issue of fore-
seeability should be resolved against the utility which was
otherwise liable for negligent planning since it would seem in-
consistent for the power company to justify its faulty planning
on the grounds that it could not have foreseen the consequences
thereof.
A possible reason for denying tort recovery against inter-
connected power companies is that tort law is not an appropri-
ate legal measure in this situation. In the Northeast blackout,
for example, where industrial and personal damages exceeded
$100 million, 2 it might be unreasonable to place the entire loss
upon fifteen power companies who failed to anticipate a com-
bination of events which would disrupt the entire system. As a
policy consideration, miscalculation by the power companies, in
48. See note 91 infra.
49. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1965, at 39, col. 2.
50. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1965, at 1, col. 4.
51. W. PRossEa, TORTs 321, 427 (3d ed. 1964). Plaintiff's intervening
acts, being unforeseeable to the power company, "insulate" the power
company from liability for injuries arising in the power failure.
52. Tnm, Nov. 19, 1965, at 36, 42; see 114 CoNG. Rrc. H575 (daily
ed. Jan. 30, 1968).
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the absence of evidence of bad faith, is hardly so culpable an
oversight that the power companies should be penalized with
the full risk of loss. While it is desirable that power companies
constantly exercise a high degree of care in maintaining an emer-
gency power pool, it is perhaps impossible 53 to construct a large
scale power pool which would be absolutely invulnerable to dis-
turbances within the system. Full recovery in cases like the
the Northeast blackout could impose a severe penalty for a minor
degree of fault, though a prospective judgment might be justifi-
able on the ground that it would give the power companies an
opportunity to increase their level of precaution and to raise their
prices as an insurance technique.
There are several possible defenses to tort recovery. Elec-
tric power companies have been relieved of liability for power
failures caused by an "act of God," or other factors reasonably
unforeseeable and beyond their control. 4 It has been held that
in order to excuse negligence on the part of the power com-
pany, the alleged act of God must have been so extraordinary as
to be beyond human foresight, and its effect must be such
that reasonable prudence and diligence would not have prevented
the harm.55 The courts have refused to relieve power companies
of liability because of an act of God where any human negli-
gence or lack of foresight is also demonstrated. 50 It seems ques-
tionable whether the courts will adhere to these high theoreti-
cal standards of "act of God" to which they lend lip service,
however, since they have been willing to relieve power com-
panies for blackouts caused by foreseeable hurricanes striking
Tallahassee, Florida, 57 and by sleetstorms from which the power
53. Since a fully reliable power pool requires not merely good, but
virtually perfect service, FPC at 1, it would seem that power failures
might result from conduct by interconnected power companies which
was not sufficiently culpable to be judged negligence. But see Priest,
Utility Service Outages and Interruptions: The "Big Blackout," PUB.
Ur. FORT., Aug. 17, 1967, at 19, 22, where it is claimed that power pool
systems can be designed to ride out disturbances such as that involved
in the Northeast blackout, and system survival need not depend upon
the shedding of a part of the load.
54. E.g., Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Abboud, 204 Ark. 808, 164
S.W.2d 1000 (1942); Kentucky Power Co. v. Kilbourn, 307 S.W.2d 9
(Ky. 1957); Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa Growers'
Ass'n, 67 N.M. 108, 353 P.2d 62 (1960); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 594 (1963);
See note 90 infra.
55. Florida Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee, 154 Fla. 638, 18
So. 2d 671 (1944), citing 12 Am. Jun. Contracts § 368 (1937).
56. Kentucky Power Co. v. Kilbourn, 307 S.W.2d 9 (1957); Annot.,
4 A.L.R.3d 594 (1963).




company subsequently protected itself by rerouting its lines.58
In a case like the Northeast blackout, involving the disruption
of a power grid having inadequate interconnections and genera-
tion capacity, the resulting power failure is apparently attribu-
table to an act of man rather than an "act of God." However, in
the distinguishable case where the extension within the grid of
an area power failure is made possible by an "act of God," such as
lines destroyed by a storm, affected power companies should
be relieved of liability.
A second possible defense to recovery in appropriate black-
out situations would be municipal immunity. The courts have
heretofore refused to relieve municipal utilities of liability
for power failures, however.5 9 Where the power failure affects
substantially all of the municipal utility's customers, on the other
hand, as in the case of a power pool system blackout, it might
be more practical and reasonable either to limit the utility's
liability or to relieve it of liability altogether. Presumably the
cost of full insurance protection against power failure dam-
ages for all customers of a municipal utility would be the same
whether borne by the customers or by the utility, even though
the municipal utility chooses to insure itself by spreading the
loss over its tax base. By limiting recovery of customers to
their respective insurance coverage, however, the major
costs of adjusting could be decreased since loss claims could be
registered directly with the insurance company. Furthermore,
since customers have no control over major blackouts, individual
insurance rates would presumably be based upon the extent of
damage likely to be incurred in the blackout. Some businesses
will be more severely injured than others by a power failure,
and a few of these will be sufficiently affected to justify the ex-
pense of an auxiliary power supply. It would thus seem more
equitable to allocate the cost of insurance protection in propor-
tion to the risk involved, as an expense of doing business,
rather than in proportion to the customer's municipal tax lia-
bility.
In view of the potential liability of interconnected power
companies to their customers for power failures extended
58. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Abboud, 204 Ark. 808, 164 S.W.
2d 1000 (1942) (proof of subsequent repairs admitted as cause of sub-
sequent power outages).
59. Lund v. Village of Princeton, 250 Minn. 472, 85 N.W.2d 197
(1957); Rossi v. Garton, 88 N.J. Super. 233, 211 A.2d 806 (1965); People
v. City of Schenectady, 186 Misc. 385, 60 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Sp. Ct. 1946); Dale
v. City of Morgantown, 270 N.C. 567, 155 S.E.2d 136 (1967).
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within the grid arrangement, the companies may desire to
restrict the blackout and limit their liability by selectively shed-
ding some of their load and concentrating the power on the re-
mainder in time of stress upon the system. Had Consolidated
Edison been able at the crucial moments of the CANUSE dis-
turbance to shed the industrial load which was capable of self-
sustenance, vital boundary ties might have been saved and most
of New York City might. have remained lit.00 In analogous
cases, it has been held 60 that in time of short supply a gas
utility may curtail service to its industrial customers, conserving
fuel for domestic customers. It has also been recognized 2 that
public utilities have the right to contract in terms allowing them
temporarily to curtail service to certain customers in time of
emergency shortage of supply. It would seem that the electric
power company would not be violating its common law and
statutory duty by contracting with customers known to have
an adequate and readily available auxiliary power supply to
curtail service to them in time of emergency. Thus, the com-
pany could contractually limit the incidence of its liability re-
specting customers having auxiliary power supplies, and a prop-
erly planned program of emergency curtailment might prevent a
power failure for the other customers, thereby precluding the
company's liability to them.
The duty of public utilities to provide constant and adequate
service has now been codified in many jurisdictions, 3 but the de-
fenses to recovery remain the same. In addition to its statutory
duty of safe, adequate, and reasonable service,0 4 New York Pub-
lic Service Law also forbids electric power companies granting
any unreasonable advantage or disadvantage to any customer
60. FPC at 14. The system might not have remained fully in
tact, but at least the great majority of customers might have been served.
See note 37 supra.
61. Re Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 74 P.U.R. (n.s.) 406, 418(Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1948); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Iroquois
Natural Gas Co., 189 App. Div. 545, 179 N.Y.S. 230; aff'd, 229 N.Y. 592,
129 N.E. 921 (1919).
62. Re Alabama Power Serv. Co., 39 P.U.R. (n.s.) 254 (Ala. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1941); Stoner v. Marysvill Water Co., 42 P.U.R. (n.s.) 228
(Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1942). But see note 77 infra.
63. See, e.g., CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (1967); D.C. CODE §§ 43-
301, 43-104 (1961); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 32 (1967); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 48:2-23 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1171 (1967). In the case
of Re West Coast Telephone Co., 62 P.U.R.3d 429 (1965), the Oregon
Public Utility Commissioner held that the Oregon statute, ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 757.605 through 757.690 (1965), "does not contemplate a perfect
service or one entirely free of problems." 62 P.U.R.3d at 437-38.
64. N.Y. PuB. SERv. LAW § 65 (1) (McKinney 1967).
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or locality. 5 While it has been held 6 that this provision is to be
read in conjunction with a later provision,6 conferring upon
the New York Public Service Commission the power to regulate
public utilities, it would seem that this delegation of power was
not meant to be exclusive, so that any unfair advantages created
by power companies should be actionable in the absence of Com-
mission procedures.
Presumably a customer residing in a jurisdiction with such
a statute could argue that he or his locality was given an un-
fair disadvantage in the power pool arrangement because he or
his locality would be left with less adequate power than other
service areas in case of disruption of the system. Especially
in the case of inadequately integrated grid arrangements, cer-
tain power companies may serve as a "hub," with other service
areas dependent upon the central company for their emergency
supply. When such a system experiences inadequate generation,
the service areas out on the "spokes" will draw power from the
"hub" company. Regardless of the nature of the system dis-
turbance, therefore, customers of the central company will have
to yield power to the other areas, so the grid arrangement would
constitute an unfair disadvantage for the "hub" area. A response
to this argument might be that the statute does not contemplate
the contingency of a system disruption, but rather forbids the
giving of unfair disadvantages in present services or rates. In
any event, if the statutory prohibition of unfair disadvantages is
to be applied to the power companies' planning function, it
would seem that a company should be held liable for breach of
its duty only if it could have reasonably foreseen that the grid
arrangement created an unfair disadvantage for the customer
or his service area.
B. REcOVERY ON IMPLIED OR EXPRESS CONTRACT THEORY
As an alternative to action for breach of the common law
or statutory duty of a power company to provide constant and
adequate electric service, appropriate blackout victims might
seek recovery from their respective power companies for breach
of the duty arising from an implied in fact contract to supply
the customers' electricity needs. The power company's implied
promise to serve is based upon its undertaking to serve a cus-
65. Id. § 65(3).
66. O'Sullivan v. Feinberg, 201 Misc. 658, 114 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sp. Ct.
1951); accord, Everbest Engineering Corp. v. Consolidated Edison Co.,
14 Misc. 2d 431, 178 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sp. Ct. 1958).
67. N.Y. PUB. SERv. LAW § 66 (5) (McKinney 1967).
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tomer, knowing what his needs will be.6 8 Breach of the implied
promise to supply electric service has been held actionable only
where negligent 9 or voluntary7 0 disruption of service by the
power company can be demonstrated. Since negligent breach
of the implied contract would apparently also give rise to tort
recovery, the two theories serve essentially the same function at
this point. An implied in fact contract can apparently be in-
voked only in rather limited circumstances, however, since
the power company often will be unaware of the consumer's
precise electric needs, or the company may have no choice
whether to serve the consumer regardless of whether it is aware
of those needs.71
Another line of cases recognizes the customer's right to re-
cover damages from the power company on the basis of the ex-
press contract to provide a certain quantum of electric service.7 2
The relatively small number of successful actions 3 using this
theory is perhaps indicative of drafting customs in the power
industry. The customer bringing an action on the express con-
tract may have difficulty proving that his damages are of the
type contemplated by the parties when they contracted. 74 The
term in Consolidated Edison's customer contract 5 disclaiming lia-
bility for power failures or irregularities caused by the ordinary
negligence of its employees probably would not be upheld
today, although it was authorized by a New York Public Com-
mission ruling in 1938. 76 Recent cases reject attempts by power
68. Bromer v. Florida Power & Light Co., 45 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1950);
Lund v. Village of Princeton, 250 Minn. 472, 85 N.W.2d 197 (1957); Annot.,
4 A.L.R.3d 594 (1963). But see Colonial Products Co. v. Pennsylvania
Pub. Util. Comm'n, 188 Pa. Super. 163, 146 A.2d 657 (1958).
69. Bromer v. Florida Power & Light Co., 45 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1950).
Actions premised upon the implied in fact contract to provide constant
and adequate electric service thus have characteristics of both tort and
contract actions.
70. Lund v. Village of Princeton, 250 Minn. 472, 85 N.W.2d 197
(1957) (municipal utility's change of transformer reduced voltage of
power supplied).
71. See note 28 supra.
72. Hippard Coal Co. v. Illinois Power & Light Corp., 317 IM. App.
47, 45 N.E.2d 701 (1942); Kuhlman Plastics Co. v. Kansas City Power &
Light Co., 400 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1966); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 594 (1963).
73. Hippard is the only recent case found granting recovery on
this theory.
74. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (1854); cf. UNwom
COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-106(1); Robson v. United Pacific Insurance Co.,
391 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. 1965); 17 Am. JuR. 2D Contracts 370 (1967).
75. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1965, at 1, col. 4.
76. Re Liability Clauses in Rate Schedules of Gas and Electric
Corporations, 26 P.U.R. (n.s.) 373 (1938).
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companies to contract out of their tort liability,77 though a term
disclaiming liability for power failures caused by labor strikes
has been upheld.78 In view of the high duty of care imposed
upon public utilities to provide safe service, it would be incon-
sistent to allow power companies to avoid this duty by con-
tractual disclaimers.
In appropriate cases, customers of a power company which
was unable to draw power from the interconnected companies in
the power pool might seek to recover their blackout damages
from the interconnected companies on the theory that the cus-
tomers are third party beneficiaries of the emergency supply
agreement underlying the power pool. The companies formed
their agreement in contemplation of supplementing the supply of
power to a member company's customers in the event of disrup-
tion of that company's power supply, and the injury to the cus-
tomers is attributable to the nonperformance by the intercon-
nected companies of their agreement. It is generally held that
persons who are not parties to a contract may recover damages
attributable to the breach of the contract under which one party
undertook to satisfy the other party's duty to such injured per-
son, or undertook to confer a benefit upon a class of which such
injured person is a member.79 Actions by third party beneficiar-
ies have been allowed where the contract evidences a clear intent
to benefit such third party directly, but not where the claimant
would derive a mere incidental benefit from performance of the
contract. 0 It would seem that the intent of an emergency pool-
ing agreement among interconnected power companies is to
benefit each customer directly by satisfying his company's con-
77. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa Growers' Ass'n,
67 N.M. 108, 353 P.2d 62 (1960); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Appel,
266 P.2d 442 (Okla. 1954), Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 594 (1963). But see notes
61 & 62 supra.
78. Kuhlman Plastics Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 400
S.W. 2d 409 (Mo. 1966).
79. Government of Iraq v. Robert W. Hunt Co., 345 F.2d 788, 789
(9th Cir. 1965); Johnson v. Holmes Tuttle Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 160
Cal. App. 2d 290, 296-97, 325 P.2d 193, 197 (1958); Crow & Crow, Inc. v.
St. Paul Mercury-Indemnity Co., 247 Minn. 426, 428-29, 77 N.W.2d 429,
431 (1956).
80. Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., 274 F.2d 890, 895 (10th Cir. 1960) (inten-
tion to benefit third party must be either express or manifestly im-
plied); United States v. Seaboard Surety Co., 201 F. Supp. 630, 636
(N.D. Tex. 1961) (rebuttable presumption that the parties contract only
for their own benefit); United States v. Aleutian Homes, Inc., 193 F.
Supp. 571, 576 (D. Alaska 1961) (enforcement of a contract by a third
party beneficiary allowed only if such enforcement was within the con-
templation of the parties to the contract).
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tractual obligation to him in the event that his company becomes
unable to satisfy such duty. Interconnected companies who
fail to discharge this contractual obligation should then be liable
to the injured customer.
An alternative theory of recovery for affected customers
might be action on quasi-contract for restitution of the amount
by which interconnected service areas who drew power from
the customer's power company were unjustly enriched.8 ' The
emergency drawing of power from one area into another area is
the purpose for which the power pool was established, so the
recovery for this emergency transaction would normally be
upon the express agreement underlying the power pool.82 In
some situations, however, the emergency recipient cannot be said
to be upon a contractual basis with the emergency supplier, so
recovery for the benefit conferred must be based upon a con-
tract implied in law. An example of this situation arose in the
Northeast blackout when the generators near Niagara Falls were
disconnected from their downstate load, and that load drew
upon the Consolidated Edison generators in New York City.
Though the power companies involved had a contractual basis
for the exchange of power, the disconnection of lines had re-
moved the Niagara Falls power companies from this emergency
transaction, and their downstate customers were not on a con-
tractual basis with Consolidated Edison. While the formal ex-
penses of generating and transmitting this power fell upon
Consolidated Edison, the great consequential losses of the emer-
gency transaction fell upon customers of Consolidated Edison,
who soon found themselves without power. Other situations in-
volving the emergency supply of power without a formal con-
tractual basis of exchange might arise more frequently should
the FPC exercise its power to compel further interconnection of
power companies.
The action for restitution of the value of the benefit con-
ferred would have serious limitations, however. There is some
authority denying restitution in the case of a benefit which
81. RESTATEMENT Or RESTITUTION § 1 (1937); 77 C.J.S. Restitution
(1967).
82. It has generally been held that there is no- quasi-contractual
recovery of the quantum meruit, or value of the benefit conferred, where
the transaction is governed by an express contract. E.g., National Trailer
Convoy, Inc. v. United States, 345 F.2d 575 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Smith v. Stow-
ell, 256 Iowa 165, 125 N.W.2d 795 (1964); Schimmelpfenning v. Gaedke,
223 Minn. 542, 27 N.W.2d 416 (1947); Durham Terrace, Inc. v. Hellertown
Borough Authority, 394 Pa. 623, 148 A.2d 899 (1959). But see Power-
Matics, Inc. v. Ligotti, 79 N.J. Super. 294, 191 A.2d 483 (1963).
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cannot be returned to the party who bestowed it, although this
anomalous case law would seem to be an inappropriate limitation
for a theory of recovery premised upon a fictional contract.8 3
Conceptually, the action for restitution would be available to
the company which supplied the emergency power, rather than
to its customer, since the customers did not confer the benefit
upon the emergency recipient, although the customers may
have suffered as a result of the emergency transaction. Fur-
thermore, in cases of nontortious receipt of a benefit, restitution
is limited to the face value of the benefit conferred, 4 or to the
amount that might have been recovered under an express con-
tract in this situation.85 Since the value of emergency power
supply is based upon ordinary sales rates, as evidenced by ex-
isting emergency supply agreements,86 restitution would prob-
ably be limited to the market value of the power supplied.
IV. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS
As an alternative to recovery from the interconnected power
companies, appropriate blackout victims might seek relief from
hospitals, transportation companies, or other public service or-
ganizations on grounds of negligent failure to maintain an emer-
gency source of power capable of supplying the deficit created
by the companies' power failure. Since the common law and
statutory duty to provide constant and adequate power applies
only to power companies, claimants would presumably have to
prove that the defendant public service company failed to exer-
cise reasonable care in the service it set out to perform by not
maintaining emergency generators. In cases arising from the
Northeast blackout, the allegation of negligence would be sup-
ported by the trade custom among the great majority of North-
eastern hospitals8 7 of maintaining emergency power supplies, and
the practice of the Boston Transit Authority of maintaining its
own primary power supply and merely looking to Boston Edison
83. Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 391 Pa. 607, 140 A.2d 100
(1958). In actions for recovery of the value of a benefit conferred, it
would seem inappropriate to grant recovery only if the benefit were of a
type capable of being returned since the legal recovery is a substitute
for such return of the benefit.
84. Hill v. Waxberg, 237 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1956); Templeton Pat-
ents, Ltd. v. Simplot Co., 220 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Idaho 1963); Dunn v.
Phoenix Village, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 936 (W.D. Ark. 1963).
85. Misisco v. La Maita, 150 Conn. 680, 192 A.2d 891 (1963); see
Bellanca Corp. v. Bellanca, 53 Del. (3 Storey) 378, 169 A.2d 620 (1961).
86. Brand at 76-80; FPC at 3-4.
87. FPC at 38; N.Y. TnwEs, Nov. 11, 1965, at 40, col. 1-3, 5.
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for emergency generation.88 The danger involved in operating a
hospital without protection against power failure is readily fore-
seeable, and it is very fortunate that the five dozen babies de-
livered by candlelight in New York City reportedly arrived
without incident.8 9
The hospital or other public service organization called
upon to justify its failure to provide an emergency power supply
might respond that its omission-failure to provide a substitu-
tional source of power-was not the proximate cause of the in-
jury. This defense seems to beg the controlling policy question
of culpability, however, and should not bar recovery. Liability of
the public service organization should turn upon whether, if
both it and the power company were found negligent, it could
claim indemnity from the power company.90 Factors discourag-
ing indemnity in the blackout situation include the fact that
the public service organization's fault occurred later in the
causal chain and the fact that the two parties have breached rela-
tively comparable duties of care. By its negligent omission,
the public service organization failed to prevent the direct, fore-
seeable consequences of the power company's negligence, and
the two should both be liable for injuries caused by the power
failure. On the other hand, a very significant factor militating in
favor of indemnification is the fact that the public service or-
ganization relied upon the power company's performance of its
duty to provide the public service organization with power. In
view of both the magnitude and probability of the risk involved,
it would seem that this reliance would be unjustified in many
cases, however, so the public service organization should be
liable.
V. LIABILITY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Another party potentially liable for injuries caused by a
88. FPC at 37; N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 18, 1965, at 46, col. 6.
89. TiME, Nov. 19, 1965, at 19, 41b. Perhaps even more risky were
the very delicate corneal transplant and craniotomy performed by
candlelight. Id.
90. See Henrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368,
104 N.W.2d 843 (1960); Jacobs v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assur-
ance Corp., 14 Wis. 2d 1, 109 N.W.2d (1961); W. PROSSER, TORTS, 278-81
(3d ed. 1964). It has also been held that contributory negligence is a
defense to a power company's liability. Milford Canning Co. v. Central
Illinois Pub. Serv. Co., 39 M. App. 2d 258, 188 N.E.2d 397 (1963). The
doctrine of last clear chance would seem to be inapplicable in this
situation because when the hospital realized that its patient was en-
dangered, the hospital would no longer have a chance to extricate the
patient from the danger. See W. PRossEn, TORTS, 439-40 (3d ed. 1964).
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power failure occurring within the context of an insufficiently
integrated power pool is the federal government. The Federal
Power Act 9'1 gives the FPC authority to divide the country
into regional districts for coordination of power supply fa-
cilities, and to order 92 interconnection of power companies
when it finds such interconnection to be necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest. The facilities and practices of
the power companies involved in the Northeast blackout were
apparently fully known to the FPC, and yet the FPC did not
intervene to strengthen the emergency supply arrangement.93
Liability of the federal government might thus be predicated
upon the failure of the FPC to take steps to strengthen a power
pool known to be inadequately integrated.9 4
An action against the federal government in this context
would probably fail, however, since the authority of the FPC to
order interconnections is fully discretionary. The Federal Tort
Claims Act specifically precludes actions against the federal
government based upon the exercise of or failure to exercise a
"... discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency . . .whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
91. Relevant provisions are contained in 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a (a),
(b) (1966); see FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205,
(1964) (FPC has jurisdiction of all wholesale power sales in inter-
state commerce not expressly exempted by the Act); New England
Power Co. v. FPC, 349 F.2d 258 (1st Cir. 1965) (FPC can force inter-
connections if requested to do so by any person selling or transmitting
electric power). The FPC can order interconnection of power compa-
nies only if requested to do so by a "person" selling electric power in
interstate commerce. 16 U.S.C. § 824a (b) (1966).
92. Enforcement provisions of the Act include: 16 U.S.C. § 825m
(a) (1966) (action to enjoin violation); 16 U.S.C. § 825n (a) (1966)
($1,000 forfeiture for violation of an FPC order); 16 U.S.C. § 825o (a)
(1966) (criminal fine of $5,000 or 2-year imprisonment, or both). The
FPC could intervene to strengthen inadequately integrated power pools
by ordering more high capacity interconnections of power companies.
93. In fact, the FPC went on record in 1964 as approving measures
taken by CANUSE power companies. NEWSWEEK, Nov. 22, 1965, at 27.
But see note 37 supra.
94. See note 12 supra. Other than a duty based upon foresee-
ability of a system blackout, a duty of the FPC to intervene in the power
pool arrangement might be based upon § 10(e) (A) of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (A) (1966), which es-
tablishes jurisdiction to compel administrative agency action unlaw-
fully withheld or unreasonably delayed. This section is prefaced by
the condition that the agency action to be compelled may not be discre-
tionary with the agency, however, and since the power of the FPC under
the Federal Power Act to order interconnection of power companies is
fully discretionary, this statutory duty is probably inapplicable to the
FPC in the blackout situation.
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. . .-"5 The decision of the FPC not to intervene in the prac-
tices of the CANUSE system would seem to constitute the sort
of administrative discretion exempted from action by the stat-
ute.9 6 No court would be likely to make the federal government
an insurer for all of the damages attributable to an oversight
by a regulatory agency in the performance of its discretionary
duties. Thus, although there is a strong need for protection
against power pool system blackouts, present law does not make
adequate provision for requiring power companies to inter-
connect their facilities if they fail to do so of their own accord.
VI. THE PROPOSED FEDERAL POWER RELIABILITY ACT
Since the reliability of emergency power supplies is a mat-
ter of strong public interest, especially in light of the great poten-
tial injury arising from the disruption of interconnected power
pool systems, and since an extremely high degree of care is re-
quired to plan and operate a fully reliable power pool, it would
seem very appropriate for the federal government to increase its
means of regulation of the electric power industry. The proposed
Federal Power Reliability Act,9 7 a major step in this direction,
would amend the existing Federal Power Act 98 to establish a
regulatory system to enhance the reliability and efficiency of
interconnected power pools. The Act would establish regional
councils, representing every power company in the region and
including nonvoting FPC representatives.9 The councils would
review existing facilities and propose further plans, which would
be submitted to the FPC for approval. As an innovation of the
95. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a) (1966); see 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1966).
96. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Harris v.
United States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953); W. PROSSER, TORTS 999(3d ed. 1964).
97. S. 1934, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 10727, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967) (Administration's version).
98. See notes 91 & 92 supra.
99. The purpose underlying the proposed regulatory structure is
apparently to leave the planning function in the hands of power com-
pany representatives, while giving the FPC authority to modify and
enforce those plans. Non-voting FPC representatives on the regional
councils would thus expose company representatives to governmental
and public interests without participating directly in the formulation of
plans. Since the councils' proposals would be reviewable by the FPC
anyway, this arrangement seems justifiable on the ground that it would
elicit the views and desires of the affected power companies in a rela-
tively free atmosphere. Under present Federal Power Act provisions,
the FPC is not authorized to intervene in the planning function, and
it can order stronger interconnections only after proper requests. See
notes 91 & 92 supra.
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proposed Act, FPC approval would be accompanied by limited
antitrust immunity for the power companies involved.
The proposed Act provides for six months' notice to state
and local agencies of construction of extra-high-voltage (200,000+
volt) lines, allowing opportunity for interested persons to raise
issues of land use. In case of emergency, however, the FPC
would be empowered to authorize immediate construction. The
Act would also extend federal powers of eminent domain to the
power companies involved. The Act would increase the author-
ity of the FPC under the Federal Power Act to require inter-
connections and energy exchanges between power companies
where the public interest so required.
The Administration's version of the Act received the unani-
mous support of the FPC100 and was co-sponsored in 1967 by
nineteen Senators' 0 ' and fourteen Representatives. In addition,
a variant of the proposed Act was introduced in 1967 by Rep-
resentative Moss' 0 2 and another in 1968 by Senator Kennedy of
Massachusetts and by Representative Ottinger.0 3 Thus, the prog-
nosis for the proposed Act, or some version of it, appears very
good at this point.
The proposed Act has been criticized'0 4 by a representative
of power company management on the ground that the regula-
tory authority conferred on the FPC is so vague and uncertain
as to constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative pow-
ers.10 5 This criticism may have some validity in relation to the
I00. HEABINGS ON S. 1934 BFORE THE SENATE Commv. ON COMNMRCE,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 90-30, at 36 (1967).
101. Id.
102. H.R. 12322, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The principal changes
in the Representative Moss' version of the Act are the inclusion of
state agents in the regional councils on a voluntary basis, the elimina-
tion of FPC-authorized antitrust immunity, and the exclusion of na-
tional parks, monuments, battlefields, and historic sites from right-of-
way grants to power companies. CONG. REc. H10475, H10476 (daily ed.
Aug. 14, 1967).
103. S. 2889, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R. 14971, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968). The principal changes in the Kennedy-Ottinger version
of the Act are the establishment of a "National Council on the Environ-
ment" to protect natural resources, the requirement that power com-
panies report expenses, and the transference to the Justice Department
of antitrust immunity grants. CONG. REC. S610, S611 (daily ed. Jan. 30,
1968).
104. Hearings on S. 1934 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 90-30, at 125-81 (1967) (Memorandum of
Lelan F. Sillin, Jr., Chief Executive Officer of Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp.).
105. Sillin bases his argument upon Schechter v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935) and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388
1968]
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power conferred upon the FPC to grant antitrust immunity, and
it might prove advisable to place this immunization power in the
organizations entrusted with antitrust prosecution, the Federal
Trade Commission and the Justice Department. In view of the
strong public interest in reliability of electric power supply, as
well as the interstate structure of the power grid systems in-
volved, it seems highly unlikely that the purely regulatory
power conferred upon the FPC would be held to constitute an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. 00
The proposed Act has been further criticized on the ground
that the separation of planning authority from management
responsibility would lead to inefficiency and poor service. This
latter criticism, insofar as it may be verified in practice, em-
bodies the very questionable value judgment that elimination of
the risk of widespread power failures should not be procured at
the expense of some operational inefficiency. The minimal in-
efficiency contemplated is a small price to be paid for pre-
venting the staggering loss which might potentially arise from
the disruption of inadequately integrated power pool systems.
For example, some 200 airplanes home in on Kennedy Airport
in New York from five to nine o'clock every evening, many of
which were literally saved by the light of the moon on November
9, 1965.107
While the proposed Act does not establish any substantive
regulation of bulk power supply, it would create a much needed
vehicle for planning and regulation of interconnected power
pools. Federally administered regional planning, as provided
for in the proposed Act, would minimize the danger of serious
blackouts while allowing power companies to retain initiative
over operating procedures. On this basis, the proposed Act
seems highly desirable.
(1934). These cases are readily distinguishable in this context, how-
ever, on the basis of the previously recognized authority of the FPC
and the defined standards of the Federal Power Act. See notes 91 & 92
supra; Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947); Carter v. United
States, 333 F.2d 354, 355-56 (10th Cir. 1964).
106. For cases holding the basic framework of the Federal Power
Act constitutional, see note 91 supra.
107. Timn, Nov. 19, 1965, at 41b. Kennedy Airport has since been
equipped with emergency generators. Priest, Utility Service Outages
and Interruptions: The "Big BZackout," PuB. UT n. FORT., Aug. 17, 1967,
at 19, 20.
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